The Idea of a University(Ⅱ)
[英國]約翰·亨利·紐曼/John Henry Newman
Now from these instances， to which many more might be added， it is plain， first， that the communication of knowledge certainly is either a condition or the means of that sense of enlargement or enlightenment， of which at this day we hear so much in certain quarters： this cannot be denied； but next， it is equally plain， that such communication is not the whole of the process. The enlargement consists， not merely in the passive reception into the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it， but in the mind' s energetic and simultaneous action upon and towards and among those new ideas， which are rushing in upon it. It is the action of a formative power， reducing to order and meaning the matter of our acquirements； it is a making the objects of our knowledge subjectively our own； or， to use a familiar word， it is a digestion of what we receive， into the substance of our previous state of thought； and without this no enlargement is said to follow. There is no enlargement， unless there be a comparison of ideas one with another， as they come before the mind， and a systematizing of them. We feel our minds to be growing and expanding then， when we not only learn， but refer what we learn to what we know already. It is not a mere addition to our knowledge which is the illumination； but the locomotion， the movement onwards， of that mental center， to which both what we know and what we are learning， the accumulating mass of our acquirement， gravitates. And therefore a truly great intellect， and recognized to be such by the common opinion of mankind， such as the intellect of Aristotle， or of St. Thomas， or of Newton， or of Goethe (I purposely take instances within and without the Catholic pale， when I would speak of the intellect as such)， is one which takes a connected view of old and new， past and present， far and near， and which has an insight into the influence of all these one on another； without which there is no whole， and no center. It possesses the knowledge， not only of things， but also of their mutual and true relations； knowledge， not merely considered as acquirement， but as philosophy.